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Abstract
Not unlike many contemporary philosophers, Leibniz admitted the existence of temporary truths, 
true propositions that have not always been or will not always be true. In contrast with 
contemporary philosophers, though, Leibniz conceived of truth in terms of analytic containment: on
his view, the truth of a predicative sentence consists in the analytic containment of the concept 
expressed by predicate in the concept expressed by the subject. Given that analytic relations among 
concepts are eternal and unchanging, the problem arises of explaining how Leibniz reconciled one 
commitment with the other: how can truth be temporary, if concept-containment is not? This paper 
presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one 
time and inconsistent at another. It is argued that, given a proper understanding of what it is for a 
concept to be consistent, this idea is not as problematic as it may seem at first, and is in fact implied 
by Leibniz's general views about propositions, in conjunction with the thesis that some propositions 
are only temporarily true.
0. Introduction
Not unlike many contemporary philosophers, Leibniz admitted the existence of temporary truths, 
true propositions that have not always been or will not always be true. In contrast with 
contemporary philosophers, though, Leibniz conceived of truth in terms of analytic containment: on
his view, for the proposition that Elizabeth is queen to be true is for the concept QUEEN to be 
contained in the concept ELIZABETH. Given that containment relations among concepts do not 
change over time, the problem arises of explaining how Leibniz reconciled one commitment with 
the other: how could truth be temporary, if concept-containment is not? Call this the Problem of 
Temporary Truths. 
Traditional solutions to this problem involve modifying the structure of predicative sentences in 
various ways – either by adding a temporal parameter to every predicate (Broad 1949, 1975; Russell
2005) or by replacing substances with their temporal stages as the primary subjects of predication 
(Mates 1989; Futch 2008) or else by relativizing the copula to times or intervals of time (Adams 
1994). This paper explores a different approach, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent 
at one time and inconsistent at another. Though not entirely unproblematic, this idea appears to be 
implied by Leibniz's general theory of propositions, in conjunction with the thesis that some of 
them are only temporarily true. A careful examination of the alternative approach, then, promises to 
shed new light on a problem that admits of no obvious solution and that bears crucially on the 
interpretation of Leibniz's views about time, truth and concept-containment.  
I will proceed as follows. In § 1, I will explain what the Problem of Temporary Truths is and why 
it arises. § 2 presents the standard solutions and points out the difficulties they face. § 3 goes 
through the reasons why that the Problem of Temporary Truths cannot be avoided by ascribing to 
Leibniz a 'tenseless' theory of propositions. § 4 presents the alternative solution, clarifies its 
implications and defends it from some objections. 
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21. The Problem of Temporary Truths
As a way of bringing the Problem of Temporary Truths into focus, consider the sentence 'Elizabeth 
is queen': 
(A) Elizabeth is queen
Since Elizabeth only became queen of England in 1952, the proposition expressed by (A), which is 
now true, was false 70 years ago. However, given Leibniz's doctrine that the truth of a predication 
consists in the analytic containment of the concept expressed by predicate in the concept expressed 
by the subject (hereafter, the 'concept-containment doctrine'), for the proposition that Elizabeth is 
queen to be true is for the concept QUEEN to be contained in the concept ELIZABETH.2 On the 
assumption that containment relations among concepts do not change over time, if the concept 
QUEEN is now contained in the concept ELIZABETH, it has always been (and will always be) contained
in it. This means (assuming, once again, the concept-containment doctrine) that the proposition that
Elizabeth is queen was already true 70 years ago. But the proposition that Elizabeth is queen was 
false 70 years ago. So 70 years ago the proposition that Elizabeth is queen was both truth and false 
– which is clearly impossible. This is an instance of the Problem of Temporary Truths.3
Several factors contribute to generating this problem. There would not be any Problem of 
Temporary Truths if Leibniz had restricted the concept-containment doctrine to truths featuring 
essential predicates (e.g. 'Elizabeth is human') or predicates that apply eternally, even if not 
essentially, to their subject (e.g. 'Elizabeth is blue eyed'). But it is clear that the concept-containment
doctrine was not meant to be restricted in this way – as Leibniz says in Primary Truths, 'the 
predicate or consequent is always in the subject or antecedent, and the nature of truth in general or 
the connection between the terms of a statement, consists in this very thing' (AG 31; my emphasis).
Equally, there  there would not be any Problem of Temporary Truths if the relation of  ELIZABETH 
containing QUEEN were not supposed to be an analytic relation between these two concepts or if it 
were somehow possible for analytic relations to change over time. But Leibniz must have thought 
of the relation of concept-containment as analytic, for he took the concept-containment doctrine to 
imply that all true predications can be proved a priori, i.e. on the basis of one's grasp of the 
concepts involved and without the aid of any empirical knowledge (indeed, what the a priori proof 
of a true proposition shows is precisely that 'the connection between subject and predicate [...] has 
its basis in the natures of both' (AG 46)).4 As to analytic relations, they cannot change over time 
because they reflect God's dispositions to think in certain ways, and such dispositions are eternal 
2 A  more accurate and detailed formulation of the concept-containment doctrine will be offered in § 4. 
3 I take the Problem of Temporary Truths to be concerned primarily with propositions, and I distinguish these from 
sentences and facts. The sentence 'Elizabeth is queen' is a linguistic entity composed by a subject ('Elizabeth') and a 
predicate ('being queen'). The fact that Elizabeth is queen is an obtaining state of affairs having as its constituents a 
substance (Elizabeth) and a property (being queen). The proposition that Elizabeth is queen is an abstract entity 
involving two concepts, ELIZABETH and QUEEN. I take the Problem of Temporary Truths to be concerned primarily 
with propositions because propositions are the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity and the entities to which the 
concept-containment doctrine most directly applies (strictly speaking, 'Elizabeth' does not contain the predicate 
'being queen', nor does Elizabeth contain the property of being queen; it is the concept ELIZABETH that contains the 
concept QUEEN). This having being said, there is no doubt that Leibniz's theory of propositions was of a piece with 
his philosophy of language and metaphysics: on his view, the structure of propositions reflected the structure of facts
and was reflected by the structure of sentences (hence his claim that “the true Metaphysics is hardly different from 
the true Logic” (G IV, 292)). Throughout the paper, then, I will move rather freely across these levels, assuming, 
with Leibniz, that any thesis about the proposition that A is B and its constituent concepts is equally, even if 
indirectly, a  thesis about the sentence 'A is B'  and its parts and the fact that A is B and its components. For 
discussion of Leibniz's views on language, and on the relationship of language to philosophy, see Rutherford (1995).
4 For a fuller defence of the claim that Leibniz's relation of concept-containment is (what Kant would have described 
as) an analytic relation, see Couturat (1961, 213-17) and Martin (1966, 48-50). For a critique, see Ishiguro (1981). 
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Interestingly, there would not be any Problem of Temporary Truths if Leibniz had offered some 
special account of what it is for a truth to be temporary, just as he offered a special account of what 
it is for a truth to be contingent. According Leibniz's infinite-analysis account of contingency, a 
derivative truth is contingent if and only if it does not admit of a finite a priori proof. So for the 
proposition expressed by (A) to count as contingently true it is not necessary that there be any 
contingency in the relationship of containment that holds between ELIZABETH and QUEEN. It is only 
necessary that there be no finite proof that that relationship holds. If Leibniz had suggested some 
way for (A) to be temporarily true that did not require ELIZABETH to contain QUEEN at some times 
and not others, the Problem of Temporary Truths would not arise. But he never did. And, given that 
not all contingent truths are also temporary,6 the infinite-analysis account cannot be simply extended
to the treatment of temporariness. 
Finally, and most obviously, there would not be any Problem of Temporary Truths if Leibniz had 
embraced what contemporary philosophers would call a 'tenseless' theory of propositions, i.e. a  
theory according to which propositions can only be eternally true or eternally false. But Leibniz 
never denied the existence of temporary truths. In fact he positively affirmed their existence and – 
as we shall see in due course – there are good reasons for thinking that he could not have done away
with them very easily (§ 3). 
The Problem of Temporary Truths is, therefore, a genuine problem and, even if Leibniz does not 
explicitly discuss it in his writings, it is legitimate to ask how he could (and should) have solved it, 
given his views about time, truth and concept-containment. If truth is concept-containment and 
concept-containment is not a temporary matter, how can there be temporary truths? 
2. How (not) to solve the Problem of Temporary Truths  
Among Leibniz's interpreters, the dominant view is that the Problem of Temporary Truths should be
solved by modifying in one way or another the structure of predicative sentences. Based on this 
view, three different approaches have been proposed over the years, each targeting a different 
component of the sentence. 
One approach targets the predicate: it is argued that Leibniz could avoid the Problem of 
Temporary Truths by adding to every predicate a temporal parameter. On this approach, instead of 
applying the concept-containment doctrine to (A), Leibniz should apply it to (B):
(B) Elizabeth is queen-in-2017
(B) expresses the proposition that Elizabeth is queen-in-2017, which is true if and only if the 
concept QUEEN-IN-2017 is contained in the concept ELIZABETH. Since this is perfectly consistent with
the concept ELIZABETH failing to contain many other concepts – in particular, the concept QUEEN-IN-
1945 – no contradiction arises from Elizabeth's being queen now and not 70 years ago.  
A second approach targets the subject: the idea is that Leibniz could avoid the Problem of 
Temporary Truths by replacing substances with their temporal stages as the primary subjects of 
predication. On this approach, the right replacement for (A) would not be (B), but (C):
5 See Mates (1986, 49-50). Against this, one could cite a passage of the Principium Scientiae Humanae (1685-6), 
where Leibniz says that in the case of contingent propositions the connection between subject and predicate is not 
necessary but “varies with time [tempore variatur]” (A6.4.671). In the same passage, however, Leibniz also says 
that, when a truth is contingent, the connection between subject and predicate 'depends on God's decree and free 
will' (ibid.). Plausibly, this does not mean that analytic relations are at the mercy of God's decisions (Leibniz 
famously disagrees with Descartes about whether it is in God's power to modify the truths of logics and other 
analytic domains). So we have reason to think that the passage should not be taken literally – Leibniz is simply 
emphasizing the point that the concept-containment doctrine does not have necessitarian implications.  
6 The aforementioned proposition that Elizabeth is blue eyed is an example of this: while Elizabeth has always been
and will always be blue eyed, it seems plausible to think that her eyes could have been of a different colour.  
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(C) expresses the proposition that Elizabeth's 2017-stage is queen, which is true if and only if the 
concept QUEEN is contained in the concept of Elizabeth's present stage. This is perfectly consistent 
with the concept QUEEN not being contained in the concept of (some of) Elizabeth's past stages – in 
particular, the 1945-stage. So, once again, Elizabeth's change from being not-queen to being queen 
poses no threat to Leibniz's concept-containment doctrine. 
The third and last approach targets the copula. On this account, Leibniz should not say that A is P-
at-t1 and not P-at-t2. Nor should he say that A's t1-stage is P and A's t2-stage is not. Instead, he 
should say that A is-at-t1 P even if it is not the case that A is-a-t2 P. So (A) should not be replaced 
by (B) or (C), but rather by (D): 
(D) Elizabeth is-in-2017 queen
The relativization here affects neither Elizabeth nor the property of being queen, but rather the 
relationship between the former and the latter.7 
The first approach – relativizing the predicate – is in line with the interpretation of the concept 
containment doctrine proposed by Russell (2005, 51) and Broad (1949, 1975).8 The second 
approach – using temporal stages as the primary subjects of predication – was first suggested by 
Mates (1989, 88-9) and has recently been revived by Futch (2008, 137-8). The third approach – 
relativizing the copula – is the one Robert Adams advocates in Leibniz: Determinists, Theist, 
Idealist (1994, 73). Each of these solutions has some advantages over the others. Ultimately, 
though, none of them offers a satisfactory solution to the Problem of Temporary Truths. Let us see 
why. 
2.1. Relativizing the predicate
From a contemporary perspective, adding a temporal parameter to the predicate might seem the 
most obvious way of avoiding the Problem of Temporary Truths. But there are at least two reasons 
for thinking that Leibniz would not have pursued an approach of this kind. 
First of all, while Leibniz offers many examples of  temporary predicates (among others, 'being 
king', 'being general', 'being a winner', 'being well-taught', 'being strong' and 'being warm' 
(A6.4.553), 'being a disciple of Aristotle' (A6.4.625), but also 'having been to Rome' (A6.4.596) and
'loving', which Leibniz distinguishes from the future-tensed 'going to love' (A6.4.1336)), he never 
says, suggests or implies that a temporal parameter should be added to them. Indeed, some of his 
remarks are directly in tension with this idea. Leibniz accepts the reality of change (AG 214) and 
affirms on numerous occasions that change requires two contradictory predicates to be true of the 
same substance at different moments of time (A6.4.556; A6.4.569; A6.4.629; A6.4.869). Since 
'being P-at-t1' and 'not being P-at-t2' are not contradictory predicates, the present approach has the 
strange feature of removing contradictoriness precisely from where, according to the texts, the 
reality of change requires that there be contradictoriness. 
Second, adding a time parameter to every predicate (or at least to every temporary predicate) is 
tantamount to building a time specification into every property (or at least into every temporary 
property). But, as Mates points out, this move would undermine Leibniz's project of doing away 
7 There is an immediate worry that this approach would not be applicable to all kinds of temporary truths:  'Peter 
loves' is temporarily true, but it contains no copula. The worry quickly vanishes when it is realized that, according to
Leibniz, the copula is implicit in the verb whenever is not explicitly present in the surface structure of the sentence: 
'The particle is is necessary in language, whenever the verb is absent, but if the verb is present, it can be omitted, 
because it is hidden in it. For example, I love [amo] means I am lover [sum amans]. So the verb is a word which 
includes the copula' (A6.4.882). See also A6.4.596-7 and A6.4.865.
8 Cover & Hawthorne (1999, 168 and 174-5) take this approach seriously, though they don't explicitly endorse it. 
Bella thinks that “it matches well, indeed, with Leibniz’s way of speaking in several passages, like the end of the De
Affectibus” (2005, 223). 
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Leibniz defines the non simultaneity of two states of a substance as the inclusion in one of a 
property that is lacking in the other, and it is plain that in general he hopes to reduce temporal 
relations to nontemporal properties of the relata; if qualities had time specifications built in, as it 
were, this would make no sense. (Mates 1986, 89)
Note that the problem does not go away if, instead of building time specifications into properties – 
for example, by distinguishing being queen-in-1945 and being queen-in-2017 – we limit ourselves 
to positing a plurality of temporally unqualified properties – for example, being  queen1 and being 
queen2. A central idea in Leibniz's discussion of irreducible temporal properties and relations is that 
the distinctions marked by such properties and relations are not genuine (in his correspondence with
Clarke, for instance, Leibniz says that two universes that differed from one another only with 
respect to the time of their creation would not be genuinely different – this is why it is an impossible
fiction 'to suppose that God might have created the world some millions of years sooner' (AG 329)).
If we replace being queen-in-1945 and being queen-in-2017 with being queen1 and being queen2, 
this problem, far from disappearing, becomes more pressing. Since, by hypothesis, being queen1 
and being queen2 have no built-in time specifications, the distinction they are supposed to mark is – 
even more clearly than in the case of being queen-in-1945 and being queen-in-2017 – a distinction 
without a difference. In short, the strategy of relativizing the predicate, besides being exegetically 
untenable, leads to a spurious and unLeibnizian multiplication of attributes.
2.2. Temporal stages
As anticipated, Mates favours a different approach to the Problem of Temporary Truths, based on 
the replacement of substances with their temporal stages as subjects of predication: 'I believe that 
Leibnizian statements to the effect that an (incomplete) attribute or concept B is contained in a 
complete individual concept A are best interpreted as meaning that the concept B is a component of 
the relevant t-states of the concept A' (Mates 1986, 89). 
One key advantage of this approach is that it is compatible with Leibniz's project of reducing 
temporal relations to nontemporal properties of their relata. In fact, accepting an ontology of 
temporal stages would put Leibniz in a better position to carry out the reduction, because it would 
provide him with a larger set of relata – hence with a more generous reduction base. Distinguishing 
between Elizabeth's 1945-stage and Elizabeth's 2017-stage is also, from a Leibnizian perspective, 
less objectionable than distinguishing between being queen-in-1945 and being queen-in-2017 (or 
between being queen1 and being queen2): since Elizabeth undergoes qualitative change between 
1945 and 2017, her 1945-stage and her 2017-stage can be seen as two qualitatively discernible 
entities.
Still, Mates's proposal faces some serious problems. The idea of a substance having distinct 
temporal stages is not foreign to Leibniz. Indeed, his definition of change as 'the aggregate of two 
contradictory states' (A6.4.556) may be interpreted as alluding to that idea. Likewise, the doctrine 
of continuous creation, defended in the Theodicy, could be taken to imply that a substance persists 
through time in virtue of God's constantly creating new stages of it. But these readings are 
notoriously difficult to maintain.9 Leibniz's 'states' (status) are not stages in the proper sense of the 
term, because they are accident-like rather than substance-like ('a state is a mutable attribute', 
Leibniz says (A6.4.392)). Far from being able to replace substances as the primary subjects of 
predication, then, states are among the things we must predicate of substances. On the other hand, 
while it remains controversial how to interpret the doctrine of continuous creation, an interpretation 
requiring the existence of temporal stages is highly implausible, given Leibniz's insistence that 
9 See McDonough (2007) and Whipple (2010).  
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A further problem with Mates's approach is that it would not provide Leibniz with a solution to all 
instances of the Problem of Temporary Truths. Replacing substances with their stages might be the 
right way of dealing with propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'A is B', where A is a 
substance and B a property. But what about propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'All As 
are B'? Consider:
(a) All dinosaurs are extinct
Since dinosaurs became extinct about 65 million years ago, the proposition expressed by (a), which 
is now true, was false 100 million years ago. But according to Leibniz, the truth of the proposition 
expressed by (a) is guaranteed by the fact that the concept EXTINCT is contained in the concept 
DINOSAUR.11 So the same question arises again: given that the analytic containment of one concept in
another is an eternal matter, how could the proposition expressed by (a) be only temporarily true? 
Here a strategy appealing to temporal stages is of no help: DINOSAUR designates a property, not a 
substance, and properties, unlike substances, have no temporal stages.12  
2.3. Relativizing the copula
In Leibniz: Determinist, Idealist, Theist, Adams rejects Mates's solution to the Problem of 
Temporary Truths, affirming that it is 'as contrary to Leibniz's way of speaking as imposing a 
temporal qualification on the properties' (Adams 1994, 73). According to Adams, the best solution 
is to 'assign a time-index to the copula by which the predicate is attached to the subject' (ibid.).
This strategy obviates the need to add a temporal parameter to predicates and does not require an 
ontology of temporal stages. Furthermore, relativizing the copula puts one in a position to provide a 
uniform treatment of (A) and (a). For just as one can replace (A) with (D), one can also replace (a) 
with (d): 
(d) All dinosaurs are-in-2017 extinct
The difference between adding a temporal parameter to the predicate and adding it to the copula is 
subtle, but important. If the temporal parameter is added to the copula, it may be argued that the 
relativization does not affect the concept expressed by the predicate, but rather the containment 
relation that the concept expressed by subject bears to it: as Adams puts it, 'inconsistency will be 
avoided by saying that the individual concept of [Elizabeth] contains in some way the predicates 
[“being queen”] and [“not being queen”], but only with respect to different times' (Adams, ibid.; my 
emphasis). 
The question is whether this difference, however important, is sufficient to avoid the  problems 
that relativizing the predicate gave rise to. Saying that the relation of concept-containment is time-
relative seems to be a way of saying that the instantiation-relation holding between a substance (e.g.
Elizabeth) and its properties (e.g. being queen) is time-relative. But if instantiation is time-relative, 
it becomes once again hard to see how Leibniz's project of doing away with irreducibly temporal 
properties and relations could succeed – instantiation is, itself, a certain kind of relation.
In addition, Adams's solutions seems to raise philosophical concerns of its own. If analytic 
relations have been thought to be eternal and unchanging, it is because they appear to be timeless or
atemporal, rather than somehow time-relative. Just as it would seem awkward and unnatural to say 
that the relation between 2+2 and 4 is not equaling but equaling-in-2017, it seems awkward and 
unnatural to say that the the relation between ELIZABETH and QUEEN is not containing, but 
containing-in-2017. This is all the more so in a context where, as already noted, analytic relations 
10 See, for instance, G VI 350. 
11 A more precise statement of the truth-conditions of universal truths like (a) is offered in § 4. 
12 We could, of course, substitute DINOSAUR with DINOSAUR-IN-2017 – but there are as many good reasons not to do that 
as there are not to substitute QUEEN with QUEEN-IN-2017.
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contrary to what Adams suggests, there are ways of interpreting the addition of a time-index to the 
copula that do not call into question the timeless and atemporal nature of concept-containment. But 
until we have a clear conception of what these alternative interpretations might be, Adams's solution
is, at the very least, highly problematic. 
3. Getting rid of temporary truths?
The above discussion suggests that the three main strategies proposed so far to solve the Problem of
Temporary Truths – relativizing predicates, replacing substances with their stages as the primary 
subjects of predication and relativizing the copula – face serious exegetical and philosophical 
difficulties. Where they do not openly contradict the letter of Leibniz's writings, they are either 
incompatible with his views about the metaphysics of time and persistence or incapable of solving 
all instances of the problem (or both).
If this diagnosis is correct, a more radical solution may appear to be called for: given that there 
does not seem to be any straightforward way of squaring Leibniz's concept-containment doctrine 
with the existence of temporary truths, shouldn't we conclude that Leibniz did not accept the 
existence of temporary truths? A 'tenseless' theory of propositions – a theory on which propositions 
can only be eternally true or eternally false – would not only solve the Problem of Temporary Truths
at the root, but it would also be consonant with Leibniz's reductionist views about time – or so it 
might be argued.
There are three things to be said in response to this suggestion. The first is Leibniz's reductionist 
views about time are neither here nor there with respect to the question whether propositions can be 
'tensed'. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish three components in Leibniz's reductionism about 
time. There is Relationalism, the doctrine that time is not a substance distinct from the events 
occurring in it, but a system of relations among events.13 There is the Causal Theory of Time, 
according to which temporal relations are grounded in causal relations (so that – for instance – for 
an event x to precede another event y is for x to be (part of) the reason why y will occur).14  And 
there is the thesis – call it Causal Intrinsicalism – according to which causal relations are grounded 
in intrinsic properties of the relata.15 
A detailed discussion of these components and their interrelations would take us too far afield, but 
it is crucial to see that each of them is perfectly compatible with the acceptance of a 'tensed' theory 
of propositions. For a 'tensed' theory of propositions can be combined with each the following three 
claims: (i) that the most fundamental truths about the universe involve nothing about the absolute 
position of events in time (as per Relationalism); (ii) that if, e.g., p is true and q will be true, this is 
because p explains or contributes to the causal explanation of q (as per the Causal Theory of Time) 
and (iii) that that if p explains or contributes to the causal explanation of q, this is because of the 
intrinsic properties that p and q ascribe to their respective subjects (as per Causal Intrinsicalism).16
The second thing to be said about the hypothesis that Leibniz embraced a 'tenseless' theory of 
propositions is that the textual evidence tells heavily against it. Besides offering many examples of 
temporary predicates (as already noted in § 2), Leibniz shows awareness of the distinction between 
13 Leibniz defends Relationalism is his correspondence with Clarke. There and in several other places, he defines time 
an 'order of successions' (AG 324). On many occasions, he explicitly says that time is a relation (NE II, 13, 17; G IV,
491-92; 568-69; GM VII, 242).  
14 The Causal Theory of Time is defended by Leibniz in the text Initia Rerum Mathematicarum Metaphysica. For a 
discussion of this doctrine, see Arthur (1989), Cover (1997) and Futch (2008). 
15 Causal Intrinsicalism can be shown to follow from Leibniz's thesis that 'there are no purely extrinsic denominations,
denominations which have absolutely no foundation in the very thing denominated' (AG 32). 
16 On this point – the compatibility of Leibniz's reductionism about time with a 'tensed' account of propositions – I 
entirely agree with Vailati (1997, 121)
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of 'Peter denies' – one synonymous with 'Peter is denying', the other with 'Peter sometimes denies' 
(A6.4.763). Further, Leibniz affirms that no proposition about an object can change in truth-value 
unless there is an actual change in the object – a point that he would have had no reason to make 
had he not believed in the existence of propositions that change in truth-value.17 Even more 
explicitly, Leibniz says that, among contingent propositions, there are some that 'are only true at a 
certain time', like the propositions that I am now alive or that the sun shines (A6.4.1517). And a text
from 1687-88 entitled De Lingua Philosophica contains a clear endorsement of the thesis that some 
propositions are only temporarily true: 
The copula is always tensed [semper includit tempus aliquod], and so is any proposition or 
statement [propositio seu enuntiatio] […]; and the reason why every statement [enuntiatio] is 
tensed [connotet tempus] is this, that one and the same proposition can be true and false at 
different times, even if everything else [in it] remains the same. (A6.4.882; my emphasis). 
Notice that in saying that the copula 'semper includit tempus aliquod' and that every statement 
'connotet tempus' Leibniz is not suggesting that we should think of the copula (or of other 
components of the statement) as involving reference to times or intervals of time. 'Tempus' here 
refers to the grammatical category of tense, as shown by the fact that, in the same paragraph, 
Leibniz uses this term to refer to a verb form (tempus quoddam Aoristum) inspired by and modelled
on the aorist tense of ancient Greek.18 Notice also that this passage commits Leibniz to the view that
propositions (not sentences,  utterances or other kinds of linguistic items) can be temporarily true. 
Here as elsewhere, Leibniz uses the terms propositio and enuntiatio interchangeably (Mates 1989, 
53f), and refrains from employing the Latin terms for “utterance” and “sentence” – which are, 
respectively, dictio (or locutio) and sermo (or sensus). 
The third and last thing to be said about solving the Problem of Temporary Truths by getting rid of
temporary truths is that it is not really an alternative to the solutions considered in the previous 
section. For, while the solutions considered in the previous section disagree on which particular 
sentence one should replace (A) with, they all agree that (A) should be replaced, not with another 
temporary truth, but with some sentence expressing an eternally true proposition. The proposition 
expressed by (B) is eternally true because, unlike the bare property of being queen, the property of 
being queen-in-2017 is one that you either eternally have or eternally fail to have. The proposition 
expressed by (C) is eternally true because Elizabeth's 2017-stage does not change over time – how 
Elizabeth is in 2017 is settled once and for all. And the proposition expressed by (D) certainly 
seems to be eternally true, for, subtleties aside, the meaning of (D) does not differ substantially from
the meaning of (B). 
All this suggests a general lesson. The solutions discussed in the previous section are nothing else 
than variations on the two main strategies a metaphysician has at her disposal to reduce 'tensed' 
propositions to 'tenseless' ones – appealing to temporal parts or relativizing various components of 
the proposition to times or intervals of time. If none of the solutions discussed in the previous 
sections can be made to work, the conclusion we should draw is that there is not much leeway for 
ascribing to Leibniz a 'tenseless' theory of propositions. Not only is such a theory not required by 
Leibniz's reductionist views about time and explicitly denied in his writings. More likely than not, it
is not even a theory that Leibniz – given his overall commitments – could have embraced.  
17 See Mates (1989, 53). 
18 I submit that this is also the most charitable way of interpreting Leibniz's use of 'tempus' in the De Affectibus 
(A6.4.1441).  It may be asked what Leibniz's interpretation of the grammatical category of tense was, but – for 
reasons that should be familiar at this point – it is unlikely to suppose that it involved any kind of time-indexing or 
time-relativization. Perhaps Leibniz would have used tense to paraphrase away reference to times in roughly the 
way suggested by some contemporary advocates of tense logic (see, for instance, Prior 1969). For some related 
speculations on the role of tense in Leibniz's logic, see Øhrstrøm & Hasle (1995, 115-117). 
94. A different tack
Let us now try to be more constructive. If the approaches discussed so far do not work (§ 2) and 
ascribing to Leibniz a 'tenseless' theory of propositions is not an option (§ 3), how should we deal 
with the Problem of Temporary Truths? As a first step towards an alternative solution, I suggest we 
should provide a more careful formulation of Leibniz's concept-containment doctrine. Leibniz says 
that this doctrine applies not only to singular truths, but also to “every affirmative truth, universal or
particular” (AG 31).19 Clearly this cannot mean that sentences like  'A is B', 'All As are B' and 'Some
A is B' are all true if and only if A's concept contains B's concept. What is the right way of 
formulating their truth-conditions in concept-containment terms, then? 
Let us start with singular propositions, i.e. propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'A is 
B'. It must be admitted that there is something slightly inaccurate in saying (as I did at the outset of 
this paper) that, according to Leibniz, the truth of these propositions consists in the analytic 
containment of the concept expressed by predicate in the concept expressed by the subject. Strictly 
speaking, that B's concept be contained in A's concept is a necessary condition for truth, but not 
sufficient one. To see why, consider:
(E) The necessary body is necessary
The proposition expressed by (E) involves two concepts – NECESSARY BODY and NECESSARY – the 
first of which contains the second. Yet Leibniz regards this proposition as false (G III, 443), on the 
ground that the concept expressed by the subject (i.e. NECESSARY BODY) involves some kind of 
contradiction (for Leibniz, there is not and cannot be such a thing as a necessary body).
Call concepts like NECESSARY BODY inconsistent concepts and concepts that do not involve any 
kind of contradiction consistent concepts. It seems clear that only when a concept is consistent its 
containing another concept makes for the truth of the corresponding singular proposition. So I 
submit that the truth-conditions of singular propositions should be stated, more cautiously, as 
follows: 
(C-S) The proposition that A is B is true iff A's concept is consistent and contains B's 
concept.
Next, let us consider particular propositions, i.e. propositions expressed by sentences of the form 
'Some A is B'. Obviously enough, the truth of these propositions cannot require that A's concept 
contain B's concept. For then the truth of the proposition that some A is not B would require that A's
concept contain the negation of B's concept. And so the propositions that some A is B and that some
A is not B could not be jointly true without A's concept being inconsistent. Leibniz's solution to this 
problem is to say that “if the proposition is particular affirmative, then the predicate is not contained
in the notion of the subject considered by itself, but in the notion of the subject with something 
extra added; that is, the predicate is contained in some special case of the subject.” (AG 11). For 
instance, the proposition that some metal is gold is true if and only if “some metal, with some 
addition or specification […] is of such a nature as to involve the nature of gold” (C 51), and not 
only if METAL contains GOLD.20 
One simple way of implementing this suggestion is the following. Call a specification of a concept
X any concept that is either identical to X or contains X among its ingredients. Then the proposition
that some A is B could be said to be true if and only if there is some specification of A's concept that
contains B's concept. But not just any specification will do – plausibly, in adding new ingredients to 
A, one should not be allowed to generate any contradiction. The truth-conditions for particular 
propositions should therefore be stated as follows: 
(C-P) The proposition that some A is B is true iff there is some consistent specification of 
19 See also AG 95. 
20 For discussion of some potential difficulties with this solution, see Levey (2014, 113-117).
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A's concept which contains B's concept.
And now universal propositions, i.e. propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'All As are 
B'. Leibniz says that “in a universal affirmative proposition, it is obvious that the predicate is 
contained in the subject considered by itself” (AG 11). But what does the expression 'considered by 
itself' mean in this context? Consider the concept HUMAN and two consistent specifications of it, 
BLOND-HUMAN and NOT-BLOND-HUMAN. The first of these specifications contains BLOND, while the 
second contains the negation of BLOND. What should we say about HUMAN considered by itself, 
then?21 If we want the proposition that all humans are blond to come out false, two options suggest 
themselves. One option is to say that HUMAN considered by itself contains BLOND if and only if every
consistent specification of it does. Another option is to say that HUMAN considered by itself contains 
BLOND if and only if no consistent specification of it contains NOT-BLOND. Coordinately, we have two
candidate clauses for the truth-conditions of universal propositions: 
(C-U*) The proposition that all As are B is true iff every consistent specification of A's 
concept contains B's concept.
(C-U) The proposition that all As are B is true iff no consistent specification of A's concept 
contains the negation of B's concept.
(C-U) may seem more convoluted, but notice, given (C-P), it has the advantage of making 'All As 
are B' equivalent to 'It is not the case that some A is not-B'. Since Leibniz accepts this equivalence 
(G VII 212; A6.4.780), I think we should prefer it to (C-U*).22 
Now that the truth-condition of singular, particular propositions and universal propositions have 
been clearly identified, we are in a position to make a crucial observation. Two notions are at play in
(C-S), (C-P) and (C-U) – not only the familiar notion of one concept containing another, but also 
the notion of a concept being consistent. For a singular proposition to be true, it is not enough that 
the subject contain the predicate – the subject has to express a consistent concept. For a particular 
proposition to be true, it is not enough that some specification of the subject contains the predicate –
the relevant specification has to be consistent. And for a universal proposition to be true, it is not 
necessary that every specification of the subject's concept fail to contain the negation of predicate's 
concept – only consistent specifications matter. This means that there is no immediate 
incompatibility between the existence of temporary truths and the concept-containment doctrine. 
For even if the relation a concept bears to its ingredients is eternal and unchanging, something else 
might still be temporary, namely whether that concept (given, among other things, the eternal and 
unchanging ingredients it has) is consistent or inconsistent. Could temporary truths depend for their 
temporariness on the temporariness of consistency?  
The suggestion may be met with scepticism. For how can a concept which is consistent at one 
time be inconsistent at another unless it can gain or lose some of its ingredients over time? 
Moreover, if we allow concepts that are consistent to become inconsistent (or vice versa) shouldn't 
we also allow things that are possible to become impossible (or vice versa), contrary to the thought 
that matters of possibility and necessity are not subject to change? These questions are pressing, 
but, before trying to tackle them, I want to explain why, despite the problems it faces, the approach I
am suggesting deserves to be taken seriously. Treating consistency as a temporary feature of (at 
least, some) concepts is not just the main or only residual option once the accounts reviewed in § 2 
and 3 are set aside. It is Leibniz's own views about propositions that exert significant pressure 
towards adopting this solution. 
21 Notice that the same question does not arise with individual concepts, because each individual concept admits of 
only one specification, namely itself. 
22 At AG 16, Leibniz says that “from a universal affirmative follows a particular affirmative. Every wise person is 
pious. Therefore some wise person is pious”. To accommodate this remark one could add to (C-U) that some 
specification of A's concept should contain B's concept. Since nothing crucial hinges on this amendment, I will omit 
it for simplicity. 
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4.1. The case for temporarily consistent concepts
Leibniz offers many examples of inconsistent concepts: not only the concept of the necessary body, 
but also the concept of the greatest speed (G III, 443), of 'the squaring of the circle', of 'the number 
of all possible units' and of 'the greatest circle of all' (AG 238). What makes these concepts 
inconsistent is the fact that they 'involve a contradition' (AG 26). (The terms 'consistent' and 
'inconsistent' are coined by Mates (1989, 67) – Leibniz only says only that these concepts express 
'false ideas' (AG 16) and characterizes them as 'unsuitable' (ineptus) (C 513) and 'pointless' (inutilis)
(G VII 293)).  
The question whether consistency is a temporary or eternal feature of concepts is one that, to my 
knowledge, Leibniz never explicitly addresses. Still, an argument can be made that, given his 
general views about propositions, Leibniz should have endorsed the view that (some) concepts are 
only temporarily consistent. Once again, let us start with (A): 
(A) Elizabeth is queen
According to Leibniz, to say that Elizabeth is queen is tantamount to saying that it is Elizabeth the
queen – rather than any of the infinitely many counterparts of Elizabeth who are not queen – that 
exists in the actual world. This means that the proposition expressed by (A) is equivalent in 
meaning (hereafter, more simply, 'equivalent') to the proposition expressed by (A'):23
(A') Elizabeth-queen exists
But Leibniz allows us to go further than this. Just as we can transpose 'queen' into the subject term 
of (A) and transform (A) into (A'), he thinks we can also transpose 'exists' into the subject term of 
(A') and transform (A') into (A''): 
(A'') Elizabeth-queen-existing is 
Notice that this is just a special case of transforming a sentence of the form 'A is B' into a sentence  
of the form 'AB is', when the predicate involved is 'exists'. For reasons that will become clear later 
on (§ 4.2), transformations of this kind may appear to turn contingent claims into necessary ones. 
But, as Leibniz himself points out (C 271; A6.4.1632), this appearance is misleading and 
propositions like (A'') are, in fact, equivalent to propositions like (A'). By transitivity, then, (A), (A')
and (A'') are all equivalent to one another.
Now, we know that, in sentences like (A''), which result from transposing the existence predicate 
into the subject term, 'is' means 'is an ens' or 'is a possibile', where saying that x is an ens or is a 
possibile is tantamount to saying that x's concept is consistent (I will explain later why I prefer to 
leave these terms untranslated):
An ens or possibile is what does not involve A not A. (A6.4.631) 
A non-ens or impossibile is what involves a contradiction (A6.4.935)
Something is a possibile if no falsehood follows from positing it, that is to say, if it does not 
imply any contradiction. (A6.4.277)
So we reach the following, conditional conclusion: if (A) is temporarily true, the concept ELIZABETH-
QUEEN-EXISTING must be only temporarily consistent. For (A) is equivalent to (A'') and (A'') asserts 
that Elizabeth-queen-existing is an ens, which is just another way of saying that the concept 
ELIZABETH-QUEEN-EXISTING is consistent. A temporary truth like (A) requires the existence of a 
temporarily consistent concept.
An analogous line of reasoning applies also to temporary universal truths and temporary particular
truths. As an example from the former category, take again (a):  
(a) All dinosaurs are extinct
23 For this equivalence, see C 317. The other equivalences discussed in this section are endorsed by Leibniz in a text 
entitled De Propositionibus Existentialibus (A6.4.1631-3). In what follows, I will mostly leave implicit the 
specification 'the proposition expressed by...'. 
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According to Leibniz, to say that all dinosaurs are extinct is tantamount to saying that no non-
extinct dinosaurs exist in the actual world (there could, of course, be non-extinct dinosaurs in other 
possible worlds). This means that (a) is equivalent to (a'):
(a') Dinosaur-not-extinct does not exist
But here too, as before, the existence predicate can be transposed into the subject term and (a') can 
be transformed into (a''): 
(a'') Dinosaur-not-extinct-existing is not  
What (a'') asserts is that dinosaur-not-extinct-existing is not an ens or possibile, which is just 
another way of saying that the concept DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT-EXISTING is inconsistent. But (a'') is 
equivalent to (a') and, by transitivity, to (a). So, given the temporary truth of (a), (a'') itself is only 
temporarily true and the concept DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT-EXISTING is only temporarily inconsistent. 
Finally, consider a particular truth like (a): 
(a) Some humans are saved
Given that no human was saved before Jesus's death on the cross, (a), which is now true, was false 
3000 years ago. But (a) is equivalent to (a') and (a''):
(a') Human-saved exists
(a'') Human-saved-existing is 
So (a'') itself, which asserts the consistency of the concept HUMAN-SAVED-EXISTING, must be 
temporarily true. Hence HUMAN-SAVED-EXISTING is a temporarily consistent concept.
The arguments I just offered rely on treating EXISTENCE on a par with a proposition's other 
ingredients. Against this, one might invoke the thesis, defended by Mates (1986, 74f and 112f), that 
EXISTENCE provides an exception to the concept-containment doctrine. But this thesis is untenable. 
Occasionally, Leibniz says that the predicate “exists” does not apply to created substances 
essentially or by definition (AG 19). But he never says that, unlike other predicates and in violation 
of the concept-containment doctrine, “exists” is not contained in every subject of which it can be 
truly predicated. In fact, he suggests the opposite. For he is adamant that “when it is said that 
something exists […], this existence itself is the predicate; that is, the notion of existence is linked 
with the idea in question, and there is a connection between these two notions” (A6.6.358).
My arguments also rely on the principle that, if p is equivalent to q, p is temporarily true if and 
only if q is. In the context of Leibniz's philosophy, this principle strikes me as relatively 
uncontroversial: it is hard to see how by 'unpacking' and 'reshuffling' concepts – which is all 
analytic transformations allow us to do – one could turn a truth that is temporary into one that is not,
or vice versa. At any rate, if we apply the concept-containment doctrine to (A), (a) and (a), we can 
show independently that their truth-conditions coincide with those of (respectively) (A''), (a'') and 
(a''). Very briefly:
 Given (C-S), (A) is true iff (A'') is. Left-to-right: if (A) is true, Elizabeth's concept is 
consistent and contains both QUEEN and EXISTING. But if Elizabeth's concept is consistent and
contains both QUEEN and EXISTING, the concept ELIZABETH-QUEEN-EXISTING is consistent, and 
(A'') is true. Right-to-left: if (A'') is true, there is a concept which is consistent, contains 
QUEEN and is Elizabeth's concept, so (A) is true. 
 Given (C-U), (a) is true iff (a'') is. Left-to-right: if (a) is true, no consistent specification of 
the concept EXISTING-DINOSAUR contains the concept NOT-EXTINCT. But then the concept 
DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT-EXISTING must be inconsistent, and (a'') is true. Right-to-left: if (a'') is 
true, every specification of the concept EXISTING-DINOSAUR containing the concept NOT-
EXTINCT is inconsistent, so (a) is true.
 Finally, given (C-P), (a) is true iff (a'') is. Left-to-right: if  (a) is true, there is some consistent
way of specifying the concept HUMAN-EXISTING that contains the concept SAVED. But  then 
the concept HUMAN-SAVED-EXISTING must be consistent and (a'') true. Right-to-left: if is (a'') 
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true, at least one specification of the concept HUMAN-EXISTING is consistent (namely, HUMAN-
SAVED-EXISTING), and so (a) is true.
To sum up, against the backdrop of Leibniz's general theory of propositions and concept-
containment doctrine, the temporariness of singular, particular and temporary truths turns out to 
require and be required by the temporary consistency (or inconsistency) of certain concepts. Given 
his acceptance of 'tensed' propositions, it seems that Leibniz should escape the Problem of 
Temporary Truths by claiming that some concepts are only temporarily consistent. This solution 
would not require the relativization of properties to times or intervals of time, nor the replacement 
of substances with their stages as the primary bearers of properties. It would also provide Leibniz 
with a uniform solution to all instances of the problem, for all truths to which the concept-
containment doctrine applies can be transformed into truths of the form 'A1, A2...An is (not)' – truths 
asserting the consistency (or inconsistency) of a concept having as its ingredients A1, A2...An.24 The 
question at this point should be: can we make sense of temporary consistency, without doing 
violence to other aspects of Leibniz's thought? 
4.2. Making sense of temporary consistency
As far as I can see, the suggestion that we should treat consistency as a temporary feature of 
concepts faces at least three challenges. First, there is a challenge of showing how consistency can 
be a temporary feature of concepts if matters of possibility and necessity are eternal and 
unchanging. Second, there is a challenge of explaining how a concept can be temporarily consistent 
if its ingredients do not change over time. Third, there is a challenge of squaring the temporariness 
of consistency with Leibniz's views about concepts – in particular, complete individual concepts. In 
explaining how I think these challenges could be met, I will try to be upfront about the costs of the  
solution to the Problem of Temporary Truths I am putting forward. While a full assessment of such 
costs falls beyond the scope of this paper, my hope is to show that they do not deprive the proposal 
of its philosophical and exegetical interest. As should be clear at this point, no solution to the 
Problem of Temporary Truths is without costs. And if the arguments I offered in the last section are 
sound, Leibniz's theory of propositions indirectly commits him to treating consistency as a 
temporary feature of concepts, given his acceptance of temporary truths. 
Consistency and possibility – Let me start with the worry that, if (some) concepts are only 
temporarily consistent, (some) things must be only temporarily possible, contrary to the natural 
thought that matters of possibility are not subject to change. The worry may be motivated by the 
principle that the possibility of something requires the consistency of its concept or, equivalently, 
that “a subject whose concept is contradictory is not possible” (Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge 2011, 
233).
Leibniz's treatment of iterated and mixed modalities raises delicate issues,25 but I agree that if the 
temporariness of consistency implied the temporariness of possibility the present approach would 
raise more problems than it solves. Fortunately, though, there is good reason to think that, in the 
context of Leibniz's thought, consistency and possibility should not be equated with one another – 
this why, earlier on, I preferred not to translate Leibniz's “possibile” as “possible”. 
Consider again the concept of a Elizabeth-not-queen's existing, i.e. ELIZEBETH-NOT-QUEEN-EXISTING.
For Leibniz, this concept is inconsistent (its inconsistency follows from the falsity of  “Elizabeth is 
not queen” and the equivalence between this sentence, “Elizabeth-not-queen exists” and “Elizabeth-
not-queen-existing is”, the latter of which ascribes consistency to the concept of Elizabeth-not-
24 The transformations offered at G VII 212 and A6.4.780 allows one to transform even negative singular, universal 
and particular truths into truths of the form  'A1, A2...An is (not)'.
25 See Lenzen (2004). 
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queen existing). Yet we know that Elizabeth-not-queen could exist, for Elizabeth is not necessarily 
queen. So we have a straightforward counterexample to the following schema:
It is possible that A is B → AB is an ens or possibile (i.e. the concept of A being B is consistent)
Given what Leibniz means by “ens or possibile”, this should not come as a surprise. As we've seen, 
for AB to be an ens or possibile is for the concept of A being B not to imply any contradiction. But, 
on Leibniz's infinite-analysis account of contingency, for it to be possible that A be B is for the 
concept of A being B not to imply any contradiction in a finite number of steps. So consistency is 
stronger than possibility, because a concept can imply a contradiction without implying it in a finite 
number of steps. The concept ELIZABETH-NOT-QUEEN-EXISTING is inconsistent, because it implies 
something false (i.e. that Elizabeth is not queen) and, for Leibniz, any falsehood is some kind of 
unanalyzed contradiction. Nevertheless, that concept expresses something possible, because no 
contradiction could be derived from it in a finite number of steps. 
The point can be put, more clearly, as follows. Call an inconsistent concept explicitly inconsistent 
if it implies a contradiction in a finite number of steps and implicitly inconsistent if it doesn't. 
Implicitly inconsistent concepts are inconsistent – so they do not designate entia or possibilia. But 
they are implicitly inconsistent – so they designate something possible. The schema above is, 
therefore, invalid – it fails whenever the concept of A being B is implicitly inconsistent.  
These subtle distinctions were never explicitly drawn by Leibniz – in fact, Leibniz's choice of 
calling 'possibile' the referent of a consistent concept invites precisely the kind of confusion 
between consistency and possibility that I am arguing against. But it would be hard to make sense 
of some of Leibniz's remarks without assuming these distinctions. In the Calculus Ratiocinator, for 
example, Leibniz says that “something is a possibile if no falsehood follows from positing it, that is 
to say, if it does not imply any contradiction” (A6.4.277). Now, every false proposition implies a 
contradiction, whether in a finite or infinite number of steps. So, if being possible implied being a 
possibile, Leibniz's claim would imply the absurd result that no falsehood expresses a possibility. 
What's more, Leibniz himself offers us counterexamples to the schema above, warning us against 
thinking that, if the concept of A being B involves a contradiction, it is impossible that A be B. In a 
text from 1688 entitled De Propositionibus Existentialibus, Leibniz considers three examples of 
implicitly inconsistent concepts: the concept of an existing pious man not being oppressed (pius 
existens non tribulatus), the concept of an existing abandoned just man (justus derelictus existens) 
and the concept of an existing man who does not sin (homo existens non peccans) (A6.4.1632). 
Leibniz says that the referents of these concepts are 'non entia' or 'impossibilia', but, as soon as he 
does that, he also emphasizes that, according to his position on matters of possibility and necessity, 
there could exist non-oppressed pious men, abandoned just men and men who do not sin. He does 
not call the concepts of such men “implicitly inconsistent” (the label is mine, not Leibniz's), but he 
does say that what they designate is only “hypothetically impossible” and defends the coherence of 
his position by appealing to the infinite-analysis account of contingency.
To go back to our original problem, then, the principle that a subject whose concept is inconsistent
is not possible should be rejected. Without such a principle, there is no direct route from the thesis 
that consistency is a temporary feature of (some) concepts to the problematic claim that (some) 
things are only temporarily possible. Only the thesis that explicit consistency is temporary would 
lead to such a result, and nothing in the present account commits Leibniz to that thesis. 
Consistency and eternal ingredients – A second argument against treating consistency as a 
temporary feature of concepts goes as follows. Recall that for a concept to be consistent is for it not 
to involve any contradiction. On the face of it, this definition implies that for a concept to be 
inconsistent is for it to include among its ingredients two concepts that contradict one another. But I 
have been assuming that the ingredients of a concept cannot change over time. So it would seem 
impossible to explain how one and the same concept could change from being consistent to being 
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inconsistent, or vice versa.  
The argument touches on a crucial point. I agree that, if for a concept to be inconsistent were for it
to include contradictory ingredients, the temporariness of consistency would be incompatible with 
the eternal and unchanging nature of containment relations. But the idea of reducing a concept's 
inconsistency to its including contradictory ingredients – herafter: the 'inclusion model' of 
inconsistency – strikes me as fundamentally mistaken. 
One basic problem with it is that it makes it very hard to see how there could be what I called 
“implicitly inconsistent concepts”. If a concept C is implicitly inconsistent no contradiction can be 
derived from C in a finite number of steps. But suppose that for C to be inconsistent were for it to 
literally include two contradictory ingredients, A and not-A. Then there is no reason why it should 
take us infinitely many steps to come across these ingredients in our analysis – we might, as it were,
stumble upon them after a finite number of substitutions. In other words, the inclusion model plays 
a villain's part in generating the well-known Problem of Lucky Proof, as applied to false 
propositions.26 
Even more worryingly, the inclusion model of inconsistency makes it very easy to prove true all 
sorts of falsehoods. For example, consider the false proposition expressed by: 
(a*) Not all dinosaurs are extinct
For Leibniz, the falsity of (a*) depends on the implicit inconsistency of the concept DINOSAURS-NOT-
EXTINCT-EXISTING. If the inclusion model is correct, this means that the concept DINOSAUR-NOT-
EXTINCT-EXISTING includes contradictory ingredients. But what are these ingredients? Considered by 
themselves, neither the concept of existence (i.e. EXISTING) nor the concept a possible not-extinct-
dinosaur (i.e. DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT) are inconsistent, so their conjunction can only include 
contradictory ingredients if the latter includes the negation of the former (i.e. NOT-EXISTING). But 
now take the concept of a possible not-extinct dinosaur, remove from it the concept NOT-EXISTING, 
and add to it the concept EXISTING. Certainly it must be possible to construct a concept in this way – 
indeed, the concept in question must exist already, for it's the concept one would have used to think 
of non-extinct dinosaurs at the time when dinosaurs were not extinct; and it must be a consistent 
concept, since, by hypothesis, we removed from it any source of inconsistency. So the embarrassing
question arises why we couldn't use that concept to prove (a*), contrary to the assumption that (a*) 
is false. Call this the Problem of Spurious Truths.
 Now, something must be badly awry in a model that allows us to generate such straightforward 
problems for the concept-containment doctrine as the Problem of Lucky Proof and the Problem of 
Spurious Truths. If we are to take that doctrine seriously, we should, I think, abandon the inclusion 
model altogether. Instead, we have to understand and apply to inconsistency the 'approximation 
model' suggested by Leibniz in passages like the following: 
A contingently true proposition cannot be reduced to identities, but can nevertheless be 
proved, by showing that, as one pushes the analysis further and further, one approximates 
the identities more and more, but never reaches them. (A6.4.776; my emphasis)
Just as a contingent truth is one that, when analysed, can be shown to constantly approximate (but 
never reach) an identity, an implicitly inconsistent concept is one that, when analysed, can be shown
to constantly approximate (but never reach) a contradiction. It is only in this sense that implicitly 
inconsistent concepts 'involve' a contradiction. There is no chance of being lucky and hitting upon 
the contradictory ingredients – nor any possibility of generating spurious truths by removing or 
replacing them – because the concept includes no contradictory ingredients, in the strict sense of the
term. 
It might be objected that, even if we can make sense of the approximation model and abandon the 
inclusion model in its favour, the original problem does not go away. If the ingredients of a concept 
26 For discussion, see, among others, Hawthorne & Cover (2000), Rodriguez-Pereyra & Lodge (2011) and Steward 
(2014).  
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do not change over time, why should an analysis of that concept approximate a contradiction at one 
time and not at another? 
I admit that Leibniz's writings provide no satisfactory answer to this question. But I want to make 
a qualification and advance a tentative suggestion. The qualification is that, if there is a difficulty 
here, it does not arise specifically from the claim that consistency is a temporary feature of 
concepts. Consider again: 
(A'') Elizabeth-queen-existing is 
(a'') Dinosaur-not-extinct-existing is not  
(a'') Human-saved-existing is 
On any reconstruction of the infinite-analysis account of contingency– and independently of the 
arguments offered above for the equivalence of (A''), (a'') and (a'') with, respectively, (A), (a) and (a)
– these propositions (which predicate consistency or inconsistency of various concepts) come out 
contingently true.27 This means that – whether or not consistency is a temporary feature of concepts 
– Leibniz did not think of it as a mere function of a concept's ingredients: while concepts have their 
ingredients necessarily, they are not necessarily consistent (or inconsistent). An objector may regard
this result as incoherent. But, once the inclusion model is set aside, it falls upon him or her to 
explain exactly why we should so regard it. 
The tentative suggestion is precisely that, with the approximation model in place, the result need 
not be seen as incoherent. One natural thought here starts with the observation that Leibniz's notion 
of existence is comparative in nature – it designates 'the difference between the degree of reality [or 
perfection] of each thing and the degree of reality [or perfection] of its opposite' (A6.4.1354). If we 
allow this margin of (greater or lesser) to change over time, it is not hard to see how a concept 
might change from being consistent to being inconsistent (or viceversa) without any change in its 
ingredients. Take again the concept ELIZABETH-QUEEN-EXISTING. The possibility represented by this 
concept must be presently superior to all its alternatives – otherwise God would not presently allow 
Elizabeth to be queen. But 70 years ago, a thorough analysis of all the implications of that very 
possibility would have revealed it to be less perfect than the possibility of Elizabeth's not being 
queen – otherwise, God would have made Elizabeth queen earlier than he actually did. This is just 
to say that 70 years ago a contradiction was, as it were, latent in the concept ELIZABETH-QUEEN-
EXISTING that is not latent in it today. In Leibniz's terminology: the concept was 'pointless' (ineptus, 
inutilis), but it no longer is.  
The suggestion assumes that, whenever the notion of existence is included in a concept, the 
consistency of that concept will be a function, not just of its ingredients, but also of its associated 
margin of perfection. This is no more than a speculative conjecture. But remember that our task 
here is not to find a solution to the Problem of Temporary Truths directly supported by Leibniz's 
writings – there is no such solution. Our task is to outline a way in which Leibniz could avoid the 
problem without giving up the concept-containment doctrine. The present approach does exactly 
this. Pending an argument that we cannot coherently fill in its details (or that we cannot do so 
without raising problems that Leibniz's doctrines would not otherwise raise), we have every reason 
to take it seriously.
Consistency and complete individual concepts – There is a third problem with the idea of treating 
consistency as a temporary feature of concepts. It plausibly follows from this idea that any changing
substance must fall under different complete individual concepts as time passes. To see why, take 
the proposition p which expresses the complete truth about Elizabeth at the present time t. If p is a 
temporary truth, there must be a time t' – earlier or later than t – at which p is not true. But if p is not
27 This is either because (A''), (a'') and (a'') involve infinitely complex concepts (Steward 2014) or infinitely many 
inclinations (Hawthorne & Cover 2000), or because they require infinitely long 'consistency checks' (Rodriguez-
Pereyra & Lodge 2011) or because they involve the notion of existence (Merlo 2012). 
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true at t', Elizabeth's complete individual concept at t – call it C – must be inconsistent at t'. Yet at 
every instant of her existence Elizabeth must fall under some consistent complete concept. Hence 
there must be a concept C', distinct from C, that Elizabeth falls under at t'. So throughout her 
existence Elizabeth must fall under at least two distinct complete individual concepts, C and C'. In 
fact, supposing that the complete truth about Elizabeth at any instant of her existence is only true of 
Elizabeth at that instant (i.e. that Elizabeth is subject to constant change) and that there are infinitely
many instants in Elizabeth's existence, it follows that throughout her existence Elizabeth must fall 
under infinitely many complete individual concepts. 
This result gives pause. Most interpreters would agree that, for Leibniz, every substance must fall 
under the same complete concept throughout its existence. If the present approach conflicts with 
such a basic and central aspect of Leibniz's views about concepts, it's unclear why we should prefer 
it to other, equally unLeibnizian solutions – for example, denying that containment relations are 
eternal and unchanging. 
Let me address this last point first. In § 1, I suggested that, if concept-containment relations reflect
God's dispositions to think in certain ways, they cannot be sensibly said to change over time. I 
surmise that, at this point of our discussion, such worry may be dismissed as indecisive, for if there 
are temporary truths (as Leibniz believed) and God has knowledge of them (as his omniscience 
requires), there is in any case a problem of reconciling the temporariness of the former with the 
timeless nature of the latter. Let that be granted. I think we are now in a position to see that allowing
concepts to change their ingredients would not advance matters in the least. Suppose that QUEEN is 
presently contained in Elizabeth's complete individual concept C, but was not contained in it 70 
years ago. It seems clear that 70 years ago we could have entertained (or, at any rate, constructed) 
some other concept C* containing exactly all the ingredients that Elizabeth's complete individual 
concept C presently contains, including QUEEN. If C is presently consistent and consistency is an 
eternal function of a concept's ingredients, C* (which exactly resemble how C presently is) must 
have been consistent 70 years ago. But if C* was consistent back then, why couldn't we have used 
that concept to prove the truth of 'Elizabeth is queen'? Reflection on this variation of the Problem of
Spurious Truths brings us back to square one. The move of allowing concepts to change their 
ingredients achieves nothing, unless we also treat consistency and inconsistency as temporary rather
than eternal.
The question remains whether we have good reasons for upholding the traditional view that 
substances do not fall under different complete individual concepts as time passes. I cannot hope to 
settle that question here, but the textual evidence on this point seems to me to be, at best, 
inconclusive. 
The locus classicus of Leibniz's views on complete individual concepts is the Discourse on 
Metaphysics. Here it is said that “the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to 
have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the 
predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed” (AG 41). This statement implies that 
each individual substance must have a complete individual concept, not that each individual 
substance must eternally fall under the same individual concept. It's true, throughout the Discourse, 
and in many other writings, Leibniz always speaks of the complete individual concept of a 
substance – but this might simply mean that every individual substance has at most one complete 
individual concept at each moment of its existence (something which is perfectly compatible with 
the view we are exploring), not that each substance has at most one complete individual concept 
throughout its existence (which is what the present view must deny).28
28 On one occasion, Leibniz says that Peter's salvation is contained in his 'eternal possible notion' (AG 32). But this 
remark, too, does not settle the question whether Peter falls under different complete individual concepts at different 
moments of his existence. In speaking of Peter's 'eternal' possible notion, Leibniz could be referring to a concept that
describes Peter's life sub specie aeternitatis and that Peter falls under throughout his existence. On the view we are 
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Leibniz's exchange with Arnauld contains a famous passage which might be thought to make 
trouble for the view that substances can switch concepts over time:  
There must necessarily be an [a priori] reason allowing us truly to say that we endure, that is to 
say that I, who was in Paris, am now in Germany. [...] Now, it is not possible to find any reason 
but the fact that both my attributes in the preceding time and state and my attributes in the 
succeeding time and state are predicates of the same subject—they are in the same subject. Now,
what is it to say that the predicate is in the subject, except that the notion of the predicate is in 
some way included in the notion of the subject? And since, once I began existing, it was possible
truly to say of me that this or that would happen to me, it must be admitted that these predicates 
were laws included in the subject or in my complete notion, which constitutes what is called I, 
which is the foundation of the connection of all my different states and which God has known 
perfectly from all eternity. (AG 73)
On one reading of it, this passage says that Leibniz's diachronic identity (i.e. the identity of the 
person who was in Paris with the person who is in Germany) requires the diachronic identity of its 
complete concepts (i.e. the identity of the concept LEIBNIZ-IN-PARIS with the concept LEIBNIZ-IN-
GERMANY). But this is not the only possible reading, nor the most plausible. On an alternative 
reading, the a priori reason allowing us to say that Leibniz endures is that, when he is in Paris, his 
concept contains 'will be in Germany' (i.e. an attribute of his succeeding state) and, when he is in 
Germany, his concept contains 'was in Paris' (i.e. an attribute of the preceding state). Leibniz's 
concept in Paris and Leibniz's concept in Germany need not be one and the same. The alternative 
reading is more plausible because it does not commit a nominalist like Leibniz to the odd view that 
the endurance of substances is grounded in the endurance of concepts. Leibniz's official doctrine on 
this matter was rather different: a substance endures in virtue on there being a unique law of the 
series governing its changes, where a substance's law of the series corresponds, roughly, to its 
essence or entelechy – not to something as ideal as a concept.29 
In effect, what Leibniz says about complete individual concepts is more than just compatible with 
their temporariness. Even setting aside the arguments I offered in the last section for thinking that 
Elizabeth's concept must be temporarily consistent if (A) is to be temporarily true, some of 
Leibniz's remarks seem to imply this result directly. In Primary Truths, we are told that 'the 
complete or perfect notion of an individual substance contains all of its predicates, past, present, and
future' (AG 32). Note that Elizabeth's predicates presently include 'being queen', while 70 years ago 
they included 'not being queen'. How could a single concept contain both the predicate 'being queen'
and the predicate 'not being queen'? Leibniz never says that the complete individual concepts of 
existing substances contain contradictions.30 Yet he thinks that substances are subject to change and 
that change requires contradictory predicates to be true of the same substance (A6.4.556; A6.4.569; 
A6.4.629; A6.4.869). Given that that concept-containment itself cannot be relativized to times (§ 
2.3), I find it hard to see how Leibniz could possibly avoid the conclusion that Elizabeth's complete 
individual concept in 2017 is distinct from Elizabeth's complete individual concept in 1945. Not 
only is this not a distinction without a difference (the two concepts have different ingredients); it is 
a distinction that Leibniz has to draw (the ingredients in question are literally incompatible). 
I acknowledge that – setting aside the question of its exegetical coherence – there remains 
something unappealing in the claim that individual substances must fall under different concepts at 
different times. A one-one mapping between enduring substances and enduring concepts would be 
exploring, this concept would be distinct from any of Peter's complete individual concepts. Alternatively, the 
expression 'eternal possible notion' could refer to Peter's complete individual concept – in this case, the adjective 
'eternal' would merely signal the fact that, for any time t, Peter's complete individual concept at t specifies 
everything that has happened to Peter before t and will happen to him after t, and not just what happens to him at t.
29 See, for instance, G II 263.
30 The suggestion is briefly considered and discarded by Curley (1982, 321). 
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more natural. But if this turned out to be the main cost of treating consistency as a temporary 
feature of concepts, the present approach might well remain the best (if not the only) live option for 
someone sharing Leibniz's views on truth, time and concept-containment. 
6. Conclusion
A tension lies at the heart of Leibniz's theory of truth. If truth is concept-containment, it can only be 
eternal. And yet truth is not eternal – propositions can change their truth-value with the passage of 
time. I have argued that Leibniz could resolve this tension in two steps. First, by properly qualifying
the concept-containment doctrine: the truth of a proposition depends not only on the eternal and 
unchanging containment-relations among concepts, but also on certain concepts being consistent (or
inconsistent). Second, by treating consistency as a temporary feature of concepts – with the passage 
of time, consistent concepts can become inconsistent and vice versa. This solution finds 
independent (albeit indirect) support in Leibniz's theory of propositions and, unlike more traditional
approaches to the Problem of Temporary Truths, it does full justice to his acceptance of 'tensed' 
propositions. Treating consistency as a temporary feature of concepts, however, puts considerable 
pressure on Leibniz's views about possibility, concept-containment and complete individual 
concepts. My discussion of these issues is just a first step in a hard-to-navigate territory, but I hope 
to have shown that there is no fundamental incoherence between Leibniz's overall commitments and
the idea of temporary consistency. Whether this idea really holds the best or only key to solving the 
Problem of Temporary Truths – and what can be learned from its success or failure – are questions 
left for future investigation.  
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